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INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent shooting in Newtown, Connecticut, brought the need 
for comprehensive firearms regulation to the forefront of American 
politics. This shooting has received more attention than previous mass 
shootings because of the ages of the victims. Currently, Congress is 
fighting voraciously, with no compromise in sight.  While this battle 
wages in the national political arena, individual state legislatures are 
also wrestling with the implementation of new firearms laws. But, 
before the Newtown murders, the judiciary began placing restraints on 
a legislature’s ability to regulate private use of firearms.  
Most recently, in Moore v. Madigan, the Seventh Circuit held that 
citizens have a right to carry firearms in public. That decision 
overturned Illinois’s ban on private citizens carrying firearms in 
public.
 1
  Until Moore, no court had held that there is a constitutional 
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1
 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F. 3d 933 (2012). 
1
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right to carry firearms outside in public. Moore is the lineal result of 
the Supreme Court’s holding in District of Columbia v. Heller, which 
held that the Second Amendment provides a private right to self-
defense, which includes the keeping of operable firearms in the home.
2
 
In Heller, the Supreme Court couched the right to bear arms in what it 
called a core right of self-defense,
3
 thereby setting the stage for the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Moore. 
 This Comment will explain, that although untimely, the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Moore is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
recent Second Amendment holdings. The Seventh Circuit decision 
gave short shrift to the Illinois firearms law, and faulted that legislation 
because of its broad scope.
4
 However, the Seventh Circuit decision is 
supported by the emerging Second Amendment test that courts had 
adopted after the Supreme Court held in D.C. v. Heller that the Second 
Amendment confers an individual right to self-defense.
5
 
Part I of this Comment will first provide a brief background of the 
Supreme Court’s recent Second Amendment cases and the Seventh 
Circuit’s Moore decision. Moore did not provide an in depth analysis, 
leaving to the lower courts the task of determining the scope of the 
right to self-defense. Therefore, in Part II, the Comment will explain 
that lower federal courts have begun to use a First Amendment 
corollary to analyze Second Amendment cases. That corollary was not 
applied in the Moore decision, but it will be applied here post hoc. Part 
III of this Comment will show that based on this framework Moore 
was decided correctly, and will conclude by explaining how future 
courts should continue to apply this standard to Second Amendment 
cases.  
 
                                                 
2
 D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
3
 Id. at 628. 
4
 Moore, 702 F. 3d at 933. 
5
 Heller, 554 U.S. 570; McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S.Ct. 3020 
(2010).  
2
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I. THE SUPREME COURT FINDS A PRIVATE RIGHT TO SELF 
DEFENSE 
 
 The Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller in 
2008, holding that the Second Amendment embodies an individual 
right to bear arms in the home.
6
 Further, the Court singled out the 
handgun as the “quintessential self-defense weapon.”7 Calling this 
right fundamental, the Court found that the Second Amendment 
merely codified what the founders knew as a natural right. The federal 
government cannot infringe this right.
8
 Moreover, the Court held that 
this right to self-defense is greatest in the home.
9
 Heller was authored 
by Justice Scalia and shows originalist analysis and interpretation of 
historical evidence. This decision has faced criticism for its refusal to 
declare a standard that subsequent courts could apply in Second 
Amendment cases.
10
 
In 2010, the Court expanded its Heller ruling to include state 
regulations as well. In McDonald v City of Chicago the Supreme Court 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment 
applicable to the states.
11
 However, aside from acknowledging that 
legislative action would require more than a rational basis review,
12
 
neither of these Supreme Court cases applied a clear framework for 
further judicial interpretation. 
Dick Anthony Heller was a District of Columbia special 
policeman who sought to keep a loaded firearm in his home for self-
defense.
13
 However, the District of Columbia banned unlicensed 
                                                 
6
 Heller, 554 U.S. at 570. 
7
 Id. at 629. 
8
 Id. 
9
 Id. 
10
 Richard Posner, In Defense of Looseness, THE NEW REPUBLIC (August 27, 
2008), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books/defense-looseness# (calling 
into question the Court’s use of the Interpretive rather than the Originalist 
approach). 
11
 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010). 
12
 Id. 
13
 Heller, 554 U.S. at 574. 
3
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handguns and made it unlawful to register a handgun.
14
 Furthermore, 
the District required that firearms kept in the home be made 
nonfunctional by use of a trigger lock, or other means. The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the city’s total ban was 
unconstitutional. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld that ruling; and 
further, the Court held that the law requiring that lawful firearms be 
made inoperable was unconstitutional.
15
 
The crux of the Supreme Court’s analysis was divorcing the 
Second Amendment’s operative clause, “the right of the people to bear 
Arms, shall not be infringed” from the prefatory clause, “[a] well 
regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State.”16 The 
majority opinion stated that the prefatory clause did not limit the 
operative clause grammatically, and therefore, the two clauses should 
be understood independently.
17
 By framing its reasoning in this 
manner, the Court could narrow its analysis to the meaning of the 
operative clause. In this analysis, the Court distinguished militias, 
which Congress can “call forth,” from Armies and Navies, which 
Congress can raise and provide.
18
 According to the Court, Article I 
assumes that militias are already in existence, essentially that citizens 
would already own the weapons that they would use when the militia 
was called forth.
19
  
The majority held that “apart from the clarifying function, a 
prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative 
clause.”20 The court found support for this reasoning in the historical 
evidence presented in amicus briefs and scholarly works.
21
 After 
                                                 
14
 Id. at 570. 
15
 Id. at 635. 
16
 Id. at 576. 
17
 Id. 
18
 Id. at 596; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
19
 Heller, 554 U.S. at 596. 
20
 Id. at 578. 
21
 Id. (referencing Volokh, The Common Place Second Amendment, 73 
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 793, 814-821 (1998) see also, J. Tiffany, A Treatise on 
Government and Constitutional Law.  
4
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analyzing the operative clause, the majority’s opinion returned to the 
prefaratory clause in order to “ensure that [their] reading of the 
operative clause is consistent with the announced purpose.”22 
The Court then determined that the Second Amendment protects 
an individual’s right to armed self-defense in the home.23 The Court 
found that the major flaw with the District of Columbia’s law was that 
it banned “the quintessential self-defense weapon [the handgun] in the 
place Americans hold most dear-the home.”24 Accordingly, the Court 
held that that ban was unconstitutional the District of Columbia’s ban 
on handgun ownership and the requirement that weapons in the home 
be made inoperable.  
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the prefatory clause 
should be understood as a preamble that limits the scope of the 
Amendment and explains its purpose.
25
 In support of this reading, 
Justice Stevens looked to various state declarations that were adopted 
contemporaneous to the Declaration of Independence.
26
 He pointed to 
these provisions in an attempt to show that the founding generation 
felt that state militias were important to defense, and to indicate that 
they were the main reason for adaptation of the Second Amendment.
27
 
Justice Stevens concluded that the preamble sets forth the object of the 
Amendment and provides its meaning
28; “[i]t cannot be presumed that 
any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect.”29 
According to Justice Stevens, the majority’s opinion conducted its 
analysis in an unusual manner,
30
 and therefore denigrates the 
importance of the prefatory clause.
31
 In a separate dissent, Justice 
                                                 
22
 Heller, 554 U.S. at 578. 
23
 Id. at 592.  
24
 Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2012).  
25
 Heller, 554 U.S. at 642.  
26
 Id. 
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. 
29
 Id. at 643 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)). 
30
 Id. at 644.  
31
 Heller, 554 U.S. at 128. 
5
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Breyer whole-heartedly accepted Justice Stevens’ interpretation and 
proposed an interest balancing approach.
32
 
 
 A. The Right to Self-Defense Cannot be Impinged by State 
Regulation 
 
In a 2010 decision, McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme 
Court made Heller applicable to the states, holding that the Due 
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Court’s 
Second Amendment holding applicable to the states.
33
 In McDonald, 
the plaintiffs challenged a city ordinance that banned private 
ownership of handguns within city limits. This case was the Supreme 
Court’s first Second Amendment case post Heller, and in the majority 
opinion, the court reiterated its previous holding and stated that 
“[s]elf-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from 
ancient times to the present day… self-defense is the “central 
component” of the Second Amendment right.”34  
Once again, the Court reviewed historical evidence, and 
recommitting itself to Heller, held that the core of the Second 
Amendment is a right to bear arms in self-defense and that this right is 
applicable to the States.
35
 Likewise, the Court looked to the legislative 
history surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment and concluded that 
post-civil war legislation indicated that a main reason for the 
Fourteenth Amendment was to guarantee that the newly freed slaves 
would have the right to defend themselves.
36
 Because the Court had 
determined that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right, “then 
unless stare decisis counsels otherwise, that guarantee is fully binding 
on the states and thus limits (but by no means eliminates) their ability 
to devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs and 
                                                 
32
 Id. 
33
 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010). 
34
 Id. at 3036. 
35
 Id.  
36
 Id. at 3040. 
6
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values.”37 Moreover, the Court rejected an interest balancing approach 
for Second Amendment cases.
38
  
While stating that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right and 
thus applicable to the states, the Court also acknowledged that this 
right has limits. Quoting Heller, the Court stated, “that the right to 
keep and bear arms is not a right to keep and carry any weapon 
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”39 
Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that circumstances exist where 
even the core of the right could be infringed or limited: “our holding 
[in Heller] did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory 
measures as prohibitions…forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.”40 
However, the Court did not make any rulings on whether the right to 
self-defense extended outside of the home. The Court declined to 
articulate the precise meets and bounds of the Second Amendment, 
and therefore left much of the decision for lower courts to decide.  
 
B. The Seventh Circuit Extends Heller 
 
In Moore v. Madigan, the Seventh Circuit held that a right to self-
defense is as compelling outside of the home as inside.  In so holding, 
the Seventh Circuit held that an Illinois law that banned private 
citizens from carrying firearms in public was unconstitutional.
41
 Under 
Illinois law, citizens were restricted from carrying firearms outside of 
the home unless they were police officers or licensed security 
guards.
42
 There was no way for a private citizen to obtain a permit to 
carry a firearm for protection, no matter how compelling her need for 
it might have been. The appellants in that case argued that the states’ 
ban violated the holdings of D.C. v. Heller as made applicable to the 
                                                 
37
 Id. at 3046. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id.; see also D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624 (2008).  
40
 Heller, 554 U.S. at 625-26. 
41
 Moore, 702 F. 3d 933 (2012). 
42
 Id.; see also ILL. Crim. Code. tit. 720 § 5/24-1 (2012). 
7
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states by McDonald v. City of Chicago.
43
 The question before the court 
was whether the Second Amendment confers a right to self-defense 
outside of a person’s home.44 The court began its analysis with the 
Supreme Court’s pronouncement that the Second Amendment protects 
an individual’s right to self-defense, and concluded that a right to self-
defense is equally compelling outside of the home.
45
 The court 
specifically faulted the scope of the ban, which prohibited most classes 
of citizens from carrying firearms under most circumstances.
46
 Finding 
that, “a ban as broad as Illinois [could not] be upheld merely on the 
ground that it was not irrational.”47  Therefore, the court gave Illinois 
180 days to implement legislation in compliance with its ruling. 
Although the Illinois Attorney General petitioned for an en banc 
rehearing, that petition was denied. The state had until July 9, 2013 to 
adopt complying legislation; and on that day the legislature managed 
to implement a bill over the Governor’s attempt to veto.  
In Moore v. Madigan the Seventh Circuit expanded Heller, 
holding that a right to self-defense is also applicable on the streets.
48
 
Until the Seventh Circuit’s decision rendered Illinois’ ban void, Illinois 
was the only state to have a complete ban on carrying firearms in 
public.
49
  
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion declared that the Second 
Amendment’s right to bear arms does not end when a person leaves 
their home, but instead follows them into the streets and throughout 
their daily lives. Ironically, this ruling came only two years after 
Justice Stevens dissented in McDonald and proclaimed that, 
“[t]hankfully, the Second Amendment right identified in Heller and its 
newly minted Fourteenth Amendment analogue are limited, at least for 
                                                 
43
 Moore, 702 F.3d at 935. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. at 933. 
46
 Id.  
47
 Moore, 702 F.3d at 941. 
48
 Id. at 937. 
49
 Id. at 940.  
8
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now, to the home.”50 In expanding Heller, Judge Posner, the author of 
the Moore opinion, held that citizens have a constitutional right to 
carry firearms for protection, stating that: 
 
Twenty-first century Illinois has no hostile Indians. But a 
Chicagoan is a good deal more likely to be attacked on a 
sidewalk in a rough neighborhood than his apartment on the 
35th floor of the Park Tower. A woman who is being stalked 
or has obtained a protective order against a violent ex-
husband is more vulnerable to being attacked while walking 
to or from her home than when inside. She has a stronger 
claim to be allowed to carry a gun in public than the resident 
of a fancy apartment building (complete with doorman) has a 
claim to sleep with a loaded gun under her mattress.
51
 
 
Although it can be argued that Moore was merely the logical 
extension of the right to self-defense, the holding was far from a 
foregone conclusion. Even Judge Posner, who authored the Moore 
decision, had earlier expressed doubts regarding the soundness of the 
Moore decision. In an article written for the New Republic shortly 
after the Heller decision was handed down, Judge Posner lambasted 
the Supreme Court’s decision, arguing that it was improvident, and the 
situation was better suited for individual legislators to make:  
 
The differences in attitudes toward private ownership of 
pistols across regions of the country and, outside the South, 
between urban and rural areas, are profound (mirroring the 
national diversity of views about gay marriage, and gay rights 
in general, as well as about abortion rights). A uniform rule is 
neither necessary nor appropriate. Yet that is what the Heller 
decision will produce if its rule is held applicable to the states 
                                                 
50
 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3120 (2010) (emphasis 
added). 
51
 Moore, 702 F.3d. at 937. 
9
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as well as to the District of Columbia and other federal 
enclaves.
52
 
 
Judge Posner further stated that, “Heller gives short shrift to the 
values of federalism, and to the related values of cultural diversity, 
local preference, and social experimentation. A majority of Americans 
support gun rights. But if the District of Columbia (or Chicago or New 
York) wants to ban guns, why should the views of a national majority 
control?”53  Although he initially criticized the Supreme Court’s 
decision, when presented with the opportunity to limit what he had 
called Heller’s judicial interference with legislative intent, Judge 
Posner chose instead to expand that holding. Although the Seventh 
Circuit was bound by stare decisis to uphold the right to self-defense 
in the home, there was no such precedent stating that the right to self-
defense extends outside of the home.   
With its most recent holdings, the Supreme Court has established 
a fundamental right to self-protection in the home and has stated that 
that this right applies to the states through the Due Process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.
54
 However, these decisions left significant 
room for interpretation by stating that the textual elements of the 
Second Amendment “guarantee the individual right to posses and 
carry weapons in case of confrontation,”55 while also acknowledging 
that legislatures could place limits on possession and the carrying of 
firearms.
56
  
As this Comment will show, the court in Moore arrived at the 
correct holding, but did not go far enough in its analysis. In Moore, the 
Seventh Circuit explained that individuals are more likely to face 
confrontation outside of the home than inside of it,
57
 and thus the court 
                                                 
52
 Richard Posner, supra note 10.    
53
 Id. 
54
 See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010). 
55
 Heller, 554 U.S. at 591.  
56
  Id.  
57
 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F. 3d 933, 940 (2012). 
10
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was compelled to expand the Supreme Court’s previous rulings.58 
While the court did not mandate whether carry could be concealed or 
open or which time, place or manner requirements would be 
acceptable, it left no doubt that there must be a legal means for citizens 
to carry firearms in public.
59
 Ultimately, the court found that a blanket 
ban against any form of carry, concealed or otherwise, is 
unconstitutional,
60
 thus establishing for the first time a right to carry 
firearms in public.  
 The crux of the courts decision was Illinois’s complete ban.61 The 
court was fully cognizant of the dangerous implications that may result 
if citizens are given freedom to carry firearms in all circumstances.
62
 
And, in rejecting the state’s empirical evidence, the court presumed 
that Illinois will implement stricter requirements than the ones that the 
state had cited to show the dangers of allowing public carry: “there is 
no reason to expect Illinois to impose minimal permit restrictions on 
carriage of guns outside the home, for obviously this is not a state that 
has a strong pro-gun culture.”63 Likewise, the court listed permissible 
instances where the invalidation of the law would have little effect on 
carry.
64
 Specifically, the court mentioned the usual prohibitions of gun 
ownership by children, felons, illegal aliens, lunatics and in sensitive 
places.
65
 The court also stated that the state may implement 
application requirements and that private institutions are free to ban 
guns from their premises.
66
 
 Neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit articulated a 
coherent approach for Second Amendment jurisprudence. In the case 
of the Supreme Court, this was done purposefully—leaving the 
                                                 
58
 Id. at 942. 
59
 Id.  
60
 Id. at 940. 
61
 Id. at 939. 
62
 Id. at 938, 39. 
63
 Id. at 939. 
64
 Id. at 940. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Id. at 941. 
11
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judicial scrutiny to be determined by the lower courts. Likewise, 
Moore did not clearly state a method for Second Amendment 
interpretation; instead, it hinted at a per se unconstitutionality by 
stating, “our analysis is not based on degrees of scrutiny, but on 
Illinois’s failure to justify the most restrictive gun law of any of the 50 
states.”67 In Moore, the court should have utilized the emerging 
Second Amendment framework to reach its ultimate holding. Prior to 
Moore federal courts had begun to implement a Second Amendment 
test based off of the Heller and McDonald opinions.
68
 When this test is 
applied to the Moore decision the result is the same: Illinois ban is 
unconstitutional.   
 
II. PRIOR TO MOORE COURTS HAD ADOPTED A TWO PRONGED TEST TO 
RESOLVE SECOND AMENDMENT CHALLENGES 
  
Neither McDonald nor Heller established a specific judicial test or 
standard of review.
69
 However, the Supreme Court did provide some 
general guidance, stating that more than rational basis review would 
be necessary: “If all that was required to overcome the right to keep 
and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be 
redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational 
laws, and would have no effect.”70 Moreover, the Court specifically 
rejected the interest balancing approach that Justice Breyer suggested 
in his separate dissent, stating:  
 
“[w]e know of no other enumerated constitutional right 
whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding 
interest balancing approach. The very enumeration of the 
right takes out of the hands of government-even the Third 
Branch of Government-the power to decide on a case by case 
basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon. A 
                                                 
67
 Id.  
68
 See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (2011). 
69
 D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); see Ezell, 651 F.3d at 705. 
70
 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.  
12
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constitutional guarantee subjected to future judges’ 
assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at 
all.”71  
 
Finally, the Court analogized its Second Amendment holding in 
Heller to other First Amendment rulings: “[l]ike the First [the Second 
Amendment] is the very product of an interest-balancing by the 
people-which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them anew. And 
whatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all 
other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use 
arms in defense of hearth and home.”72 The Court used this analogy to 
respond to Justice Breyer’s dissent, stating that: 
 
Justice Breyer chides us for leaving so many applications of 
the right to keep and bear arms in doubt, and for not 
providing extensive historical justification for those 
regulations of the right that we describe as permissible. But 
since this is case represents this Court’s first in-depth 
examination of the Second Amendment, one should not 
expect it to clarify the entire field, any more than…our first 
in-depth Free Exercise Clause case, left that area in a state of 
utter certainty. And there will be time enough to expound 
upon the historical justification for the exceptions we have 
mentioned if and when those exceptions come before us.
73
 
 
Evidently, subsequent courts saw this repeated reference to the 
First Amendment as a signpost guiding them through new and 
unchartered territory. Therefore, despite the sparse guidance from the 
Supreme Court, lower courts have begun to flesh out the levels of 
scrutiny that apply in Second Amendment cases by using applicable 
First Amendment analysis. 
 
                                                 
71
 Id. at 634. 
72
 Id. at 635. 
73
 Id. 
13
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A. The First Amendment as an Analogy to the Second Amendment 
 
Similar to Heller, in Ezell v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit 
analogized the Second Amendment’s freedoms to those of the First 
Amendment.
74
 Noting that Heller did not specify “any doctrinal test 
for resolving future claims,”75 the Seventh Circuit used the Supreme 
Court’s prior First Amendment holdings in order to determine the 
proper doctrinal test applicable to the Second Amendment.
76
  Ezell 
was brought after the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonald, and it 
involved a challenge to the City of Chicago’s initial legislative 
response to McDonald. Amongst other things, the city’s new ordinance 
banned private gun ranges within its borders, while simultaneously 
making range training a mandatory condition for handgun 
ownership.
77
 The lower court held that the plaintiffs did not have 
standing because they were not irreparably harmed and because they 
could not succeed on the merits.   However, the Court of Appeals 
reversed, finding that the plaintiffs had standing to bring this cause of 
action before the court.
78
 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit had to first determine whether the 
plaintiffs stated a sufficient cause of action before preceeding on the 
merits. Turning to the merits, the court first addressed the issue of 
what standard or doctrinal test to use in its Second Amendment 
analysis.  Paraphrasing McDonald, the court reasoned that:  
 
when state-or local government action is challenged the focus 
of the original-meaning inquiry is carried forward in time; the 
Second Amendment’s scope as a limitation on the States 
depends on how the right was understood when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified...this wider historical 
lens is required if we are to follow the Court’s lead in 
                                                 
74
 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (2011). 
75
 Id. at 701. 
76
 Id. at 702, 704. 
77
 Id. at 705. 
78
 Id. at 693.  
14
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resolving questions about the scope of the Second 
Amendment by consulting its original public meaning as both 
a starting point and an important constraint on the analysis”79 
For the court, original meaning acted both as a starting point 
and as a constraint on its analysis.
80
 
 
Looking to Heller for guidance, the court found that that the case 
lacked “any doctrinal test for resolving future claims.”81 And 
analogizing the Second Amendment to the First Amendment, the court 
determined that because the Supreme Court had already laid a 
framework for a “scope” inquiry in some First Amendment82 
challenges to state action, this framework could also serve to analyze 
“scope” in Second Amendment cases.83 Therefore, in Ezell, the court 
applied this First Amendment framework to analyze the facts of a 
Second Amendment case. 
Applying this analysis, the Seventh Circuit first looked at 
Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court had previously 
determined that certain “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been 
thought to raise any Constitutional problems,” exist.84  Among these 
unprotected classes of speech are fraud, defamation, incitement and 
speech integral to criminal conduct.
85
 Moreover, when the Court has 
“identified categories of speech as fully outside the protection of the 
First Amendment, it has not been on the basis of a simple cost-benefit 
analysis.”86  Rather, the Court used history and legal tradition to 
determine whether a type of speech falls within the First Amendment’s 
                                                 
79
 Id. at 702. 
80
 Id.  
81
 Id. at 701. 
82
 Id. at 702. 
83
 Id. at 701. 
84
 U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S.Ct 1577, 1584 (2010). 
85
 Id. 
86
 Id. at 1586. 
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protection.
87
 Historically, speech that was obscene or defamatory has 
never fallen within the scope of the First Amendment’s protections.88 
Applying that same historical analysis to the Second Amendment, 
the Ezell court found that both Heller and McDonald suggest that 
some gun laws will survive Second Amendment challenges because 
they fall outside of the scope of the right as publically understood 
when the Bill of Rights was ratified.
89
 But, the onus is on the 
government to show that the challenged law:  
 
…regulates activity falling outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment right as it was understood at the relevant 
historical moment- 1791 [ratification of the Bill of Rights] or 
1868 [ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment]- then the 
analysis can stop there and the regulated activity is 
categorically unprotected.”90 If however, the government 
cannot meet this burden, the court must then “evaluate the 
regulatory means the government has chosen and the public-
benefits end it seeks to achieve.”91 Courts must determine 
how close the law comes to the core of the Second 
Amendment right and the severity of the law’s burden on the 
right.
92
 
 
In Ezell, the court determined that the city could not produce 
historical evidence clearly indicating that the regulation was beyond 
the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection. The court cited two 
Seventh Circuit cases that applied intermediate scrutiny after first 
determining that the state action infringed upon the Second 
                                                 
87
 Ezell, 651 F.3d at 702.  
88
 Id. 
89
 Id. at 702, 703. 
90
 Id. at 703. 
91
 Id.  
92
 Id. 
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Amendment right.
93
 The court added that this general framework had 
been followed by the Third, Fourth and Tenth Circuits.
94
  
In applying this framework to the facts before it, the court held 
that firing ranges did fall within the “scope” of the Second 
Amendment.
95
 Drawing on Heller and McDonald, “[t]he Court 
emphasized in both cases that the central component of the Second 
Amendment is the right to keep and bear arms for defense of self, 
family, and home.”96 In Ezell, the court held that the core right to 
possess firearms for protection implicates a further right to training 
with those weapons.
97
After completing this two-prong analysis, the 
court then turned to the proper standard of scrutiny.   
The court synthesized the standards of scrutiny for First 
Amendment cases into a framework for analyzing Second Amendment 
cases: 
  
[W]e can distill this First Amendment doctrine and 
extrapolate a few general principles to the Second 
Amendment context. First, a severe burden on the core 
Second Amendment right of armed self-defense will require 
an extremely strong public-interest justification and a close fit 
between the government’s means and its end. Second, laws 
restricting activity lying closer to the margins of the Second 
Amendment right, laws that merely regulate rather than 
restrict, and modest burdens on the right may be more easily 
justified. How much more easily depends on the relative 
severity of the burden and its proximity to the core of the 
right.
98
 
 
                                                 
93
 See U.S. v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (2010); see also U.S. v Williams, 616 F.3d 
685 (2010). 
94
 Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703.  
95
 Id. at 709. 
96
 Id. at 704 (paraphrasing Heller and McDonald) (internal quotations omitted). 
97
 Id. 
98
 Id. at 708. 
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 Further, the court stated that reviewing the city’s ban on all firing 
ranges would require “not quite strict scrutiny.”99  Rather, in order to 
overcome its burden, the city would have to show that civilian target 
practice at a firing range creates such genuine and serious risks to 
public safety that prohibiting range training throughout the city is 
justified.
100
 The fact that the plaintiffs were all law-abiding citizens 
whose Second Amendment rights were entitled to full solicitude under 
Heller was integral to the court’s reasoning.101 Ultimately, the court 
held that the right to self-defense also implies a right to remain 
proficient in the use of firearms, and to have access to training 
facilities.
102
 
103
 Moreover, a right to have a firing range so that a 
citizen may remain proficient implicates a right to travel with your 
firearm to get to the firing range. It also implicates a right to have and 
to use a firearm outside of the home. Therefore, utilizing this test in 
Moore would require heightened scrutiny. Extrapolating this holding 
to carrying firearms in public, the Illinois concealed carry ban affected 
every class of citizen. This was not a modest burden on the right to 
self-defense; it was a severe burden on the core right because it 
prohibited law-abiding citizens from protecting themselves outside of 
the home. 
Ezell is not the only federal case that has articulated a two-prong 
approach to Second Amendment cases. While confirming the 
defendant’s conviction for possessing a firearm with an obliterated 
serial number, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that Heller 
suggests: 
 
...a two-pronged approach to Second Amendment challenges. 
First we ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden on 
conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendments 
guarantee…If it does, we evaluate the law under some form 
                                                 
99
 Id. 
100
 Id.  
101
 Id. 
102
 Id.  
103
 Id. at 709. 
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of means-end scrutiny. If the law passes muster under that 
standard, it is constitutional. If it fails it is invalid.
104
 
 
Therefore, taking these precedents into account, one would 
assume the Seventh Circuit would have used a similar test in deciding 
Moore.  Similar to Ezell, the Moore court was faced with a blanket 
prohibition and a challenge on Second Amendment grounds.
105
 Like 
gun ranges in Ezell, the prohibition in Moore effected citizens 
irrespective of their standing in the community.
106
 Felons and law- 
abiding citizens were treated alike in Illinois’s ban on carrying 
firearms. However, while the Moore court acknowledged Ezell, it did 
not utilize the framework adopted by the Ezell court.
107
 And, while 
holding that more than rational basis review would be required, the 
court did not attempt to explain what level of scrutiny should be 
applied.
108
 Below, the facts in Moore will be reanalyzed using the 
more thorough two pronged analysis used by other federal courts. 
 
B. Scrutinizing the Moore Decision 
 
The court in Moore arrived at the correct ruling; however, the 
opinion did not provide a clear method for emulation. In Moore, the 
court seemed to rely predominately upon basic logic rather than 
thorough analysis.  The Supreme Court has interpreted the Second 
Amendment to “guarantee the individual right to posses and carry 
weapons in case of confrontation.”109 However, the Court has never 
explicitly found a right to carry weapons in public.  Yet, the Seventh 
Circuit inferred a right to carry weapons in public, stating that “[t]he 
Supreme Court has decided that the amendment confers a right to bear 
                                                 
104
 U.S. v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 87 (3d Cir. 2010); see also U.S. v. 
Chester, 628 F. 3d 85, 89 (2010).  
105
 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F. 3d 933, 941 (2012). 
106
 Id. 
107
 Id. at 939. 
108
 Id.  
109
 D.C. v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008). 
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arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as 
inside . . . [t]he Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second 
Amendment therefore compels us to reverse.”110  Because the 
Supreme Court has indicated that the Second Amendment confers an 
individual right to self-defense, the court stated that therefore “we 
can’t…ignore the implication of the analysis that the constitutional 
right of armed self-defense is broader than the right to have a gun in 
ones home.”111 
As stated, the Seventh Circuit’s Moore decision did not articulate 
any level of judicial scrutiny, opting instead to base its decision on 
“Illinois’s failure to justify the most restrictive gun law of any of the 
50 states.”112 However, the court did state that Illinois would have to 
provide more than a rational basis and show that its “sweeping ban” 
was justified by an increase in public safety.
113
  Although the majority 
in Moore did hint at many of the factors that were articulated in Ezell 
and other cases, it did not do so systematically.  In its opinion, the 
court tersely passed over the empirical data and the history of the 
amendment without specifically adopting it to the framework that had 
been established. The remainder of this article will apply the judicial 
test established in Ezell to the facts presented in Moore. 
 
 C. Carry Falls within the Scope of the Second Amendment 
 
According to Ezell, the first step in Moore should have been to 
determine whether the Second Amendment protects the carrying of 
firearms by individuals.
114
 As previously mentioned, scope is 
determined by looking to the amendment at the time that it was 
                                                 
110
 Moore, 702 F. 3d at 942. 
111
 Id. at 935. 
112
 Id. at 941.  
113
 Id. 
114
 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2011). The court 
acknowledged that the first step in some Second Amendment cases would be a 
“scope” question. 
20
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enacted.
115
 Here it is important to note some confusion created by 
McDonald. In Ezell, the court stated that “when a state- or local-
government action is challenged the focus of the original meaning 
inquiry is carried forward in time; the Second Amendment’s scope as a 
limitation on the states depends on how the right was understood when 
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.”116 However, in Moore, the 
court states that 1791, the year that the Second Amendment was 
ratified, is the relevant year.
117
 The reason for this apparent 
disagreement is likely due to the Supreme Court’s expansive opinion 
in McDonald.  
After declaring that it would be incongruous to apply different 
standards depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or 
federal court,
118
 the Supreme Court then spends a large portion of its 
opinion in McDonald discussing the post-civil war implications of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The relevant year of inquiry is 1791; 
however, in this circumstance it actually matters very little. This fact is 
made clear by McDonald, first when the Court stated that 
“incorporated Bill of Rights protections are all to be enforced against 
the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same 
standards that protect those personal rights against federal 
encroachment”119 and second when the Court introduces evidence that 
both the framers of the Constitution
120
 and the drafters of the 
Fourteenth Amendment
121
 believed that self-defense was an important 
reason for their respective actions. This history implies that the 
relevant historical inquiry should focus on the drafting of the Second 
Amendment, but the Court spends a significant portion of its opinion 
discussing the post-civil war reasons for drafting the Fourteenth 
                                                 
115
 Moore, 702 F. 3d at 935.  
116
 Ezell, 651 F.3d at 702. 
117
 Moore, 702 F. 3d at 935.  
118
 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3035 (2010).  
119
 Id. at 3035. 
120
 D.C. v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 3037 (2008). 
121
 Id. at 3038. 
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Amendment.
122
 Regardless of the year of inquiry, the underlying right 
remains the same and is applied on the federal and state level with the 
same level of scrutiny.
123
  
An article written for the Washington Post’s blog is useful to 
elucidate the changing interpretation of the Second Amendment over 
time. The author, Ezra Klein, shows two photographs that were 
pointed out to him by Professor Akhil Reed Amar of Yale Law.
124
 
Professor Amar is a constitutional scholar whose work had been cited 
in McDonald.
125
 According to Professor Amar, these paintings 
illustrate the changing landscape of the Second Amendment’s 
interpretation.
126
 And although he does not agree with the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Founder’s understanding of the right to 
bear arms, he does ultimately conclude that “[h]aving guns in homes 
for self protection is a very deep part of American culture.”127 The first 
painting is by John Trumball, entitled “Death of General Warren at 
Bunker Hill,” and it shows the founders battling the British at Bunker 
Hill. Professor Amar claims that this painting depicts the original 
vision of the Second Amendment: 
 
                                                 
122
 Id. at 3038, 3048.   
123
 McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at 3098.  
124
 Ezra Klein, A History of the Second Amendment In Two Paintings, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 15, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/12/15/a-history-of-the-
second-amendment-in-two-paintings/. 
125
 McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at 3020, 3029, 3074, 3041, 3039.  
126
 Id. 
127
 Id. 
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The second illustration shows the Freedman’s Bureau where 
newly freed slaves faced off against a mob of angry Klansmen with a 
reconstruction officer standing in between them: 
 
 
 
These illustrations help to clarify that although the actors may 
have changed, each generation felt that the bearing of arms was a 
necessary tool for an individual’s self-defense. 
The Supreme Court reviewed the historical record in Heller and 
stated that the right to self-defense is the core of the Second 
23
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Amendment.
128
 Because this core right is fundamental, the right does 
not shift. If a right is fundamental, then the only relevant period of 
inquiry is when that right was written into law. Thus, the Court’s use 
of historical evidence from a later time did nothing more than 
elucidate the nature of that right.
129
 
Establishing the appropriate historical period focuses the inquiry, 
but it does not end it. In Moore, the court then should have identified 
the “scope” of the right as understood by the Framers when the Second 
Amendment was enacted. In deciding Heller, the Supreme Court was 
faced with a regulation that forbade operable firearms in the home. 
Therefore, its holding was appropriately limited to self-defense in the 
home. However, in it analysis, the Court did make note of two 
historical pieces of evidence that point to the proposition that the 
carrying of firearms was understood to be included within the original 
meaning of the Second Amendment. The court pointed to a Louisiana 
case from 1850, State v. Chandler, holding that citizens had a right to 
carry firearms openly: “[t]his is the right guaranteed by the 
constitution of the United States, and which is calculated to incite men 
to a manly and noble defense of themselves, if necessary, and of their 
country, without any tendency to secret advantages and unmanly 
assassinations.”130 Likewise, the Court cited to a Georgia statute that 
implored men that qualified for military service to carry firearms to 
places of worship.
131
 These cases show that when the Second 
Amendment was ratified, at least some people believed that it 
conferred a right to carry firearms outside of the home. And as stated 
by the Moore court, “one doesn’t have to be a historian to realize that a 
right to keep and bear arms for personal self-defense in the eighteenth 
century could not rationally have been limited to the home. . . One 
would need from time to time to leave one’s home to obtain supplies 
from the nearest trading post, and en route one would be as much 
                                                 
128
 D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008). 
129
 Id. at 616 (holding that the right to keep and bear arms was considered 
fundamental to the drafters of the Bill of Rights). 
130
 Id. at 613 (citing State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850)). 
131
 Id. at 601. 
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(probably more) at risk if unarmed as one would be in one’s home 
unarmed.”132 
If the respondents in Moore raised an alternative historical 
analysis it was not repeated in the opinion. However, some evidence  
mentioned in McDonald indicates that there was a belief that the right 
to carry firearms outside of the home was envisioned by the Second 
Amendment. 
 
D. The Appropriate level of Judicial Scrutiny 
 
Determining the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply in Second 
Amendment cases has caused the most differentiation between the 
circuits when applying this test. Similar to the Supreme Court’s 
previous holdings, the Moore court purposively eschewed judicial 
scrutiny in arriving at its decision, stating that, “our analysis is not 
based on degrees of scrutiny, but on Illinois’s failure to justify the 
most restrictive gun law of any of the 50 states.”133 However, in its 
opinion, the court did address a previous Second Amendment decision 
that had been made by the Second Circuit. That decision held New 
York’s requirement that individuals show “proper cause” when 
applying for concealed carry licenses constitutional.
134
  In upholding 
the law, the Seventh Circuit opined that Second Amendment cases 
require a sliding scale of scrutiny based on the nature of the offending 
legislations burden on the Second Amendment right. Although New 
York’s law was one of the strictest in the nation, I would imagine 
second only to Illinois’s, that ban was upheld using intermediate 
scrutiny. 
Rather than delineating a specific degree of scrutiny, in U.S. v. 
Chester the Fourth Circuit argued that a sliding scale is the most 
appropriate way to determine the applicable level of scrutiny.
 135
 In 
Chester, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument for strict scrutiny, 
                                                 
132
 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (2012). 
133
 Id. at 941. 
134
 Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 84 (2012). 
135
 U.S. v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (2010). 
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stating “the level of scrutiny we apply depends on the nature of the 
conduct being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law 
burdens the right.”136 The court referred to First Amendment cases as 
illustrative examples, noting “a content based speech restriction on 
non-commercial speech is permissible only if it satisfies strict scrutiny. 
But, courts review content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations 
using an intermediate level of scrutiny.”137 The court then held that 
intermediate scrutiny was most appropriate; however, the court found 
that Chester’s claim was not within the scope of the Amendment 
because he had a previous conviction for domestic violence.
138
 
According to the Fourth Circuit, in keeping with the First Amendment 
corollary, the decision to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny is 
determined by the nature of the challenged regulation. Although, the 
Seventh Circuit differentiated Chester, if it had applied the sliding 
scale analysis it would have determined that Illinois’s ban required 
strict scrutiny. 
Thus, in Moore, the court should have determined whether the 
restriction was most similar to a content based restriction—requiring 
strict scrutiny—or if it was closer to a time place and manner 
limitation, which would require intermediate scrutiny. Reasonable 
minds may differ, but facially a regulation that forestalls all law-
abiding citizens from carrying firearms seems to favor a content-based 
strict scrutiny analysis. Moreover, in Kachalsky v. County of 
Westchester, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that this 
type of ban would require strict scrutiny. There, the court stated, 
“heightened scrutiny is triggered only by those restrictions that (like 
the complete prohibition in handguns struck down in Heller) operate 
as a substantial burden on the ability of law abiding citizens to posses 
and use a firearm for self defense (or for other lawful purposes).”139 
In Kachalsky, the Second Circuit also applied intermediate 
scrutiny to New York State’s handgun licensing scheme that required a 
                                                 
136
 Id. 
137
 Id. 
138
 Id. at 683. 
139
 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93. 
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showing of “proper cause” before a license would be issued.140 New 
York issued four types of carry permits; the first two were “shall 
issue” permits limited to the home or a merchant’s place of 
business.
141
 The third type of permit was also a “shall issue” permit 
that was limited to certain professions.
142
 The final type of permit – 
the one challenged in this case – was also a “shall issue” permit but it 
required a showing of “proper cause.”143 Proper cause was not defined 
in the statute but it had been judicially defined as “a special need for 
self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community or 
of persons engaged in the same profession.”144 For those seeking the 
permit for hunting or target practice the license was issued on a limited 
basis.
145
 However, for those seeking a general carry permit the 
application process was rigorous.
146
 The plaintiffs’ applications had all 
been denied, despite the fact that one of the plaintiffs claimed that her 
status as a transgender female put her at great risk of violence.
147
  
Kachalsky helps to clarify three important issues. First, it supports 
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion by stating that carrying firearms outside 
of the home must have some bearing in the Second Amendment.
148
  
Second, the court acknowledged, but did not fully adopt, the First 
Amendment analogy. 
149
 The court noted that this analogy has existed 
before it was articulated in Heller,
150
 but stated that it would be 
imprudent to apply the analogy equally.
151
 The court was specifically 
referring to the plaintiff’s contention that New York law required prior 
                                                 
140
 Id. at 84. 
141
 Id. at 86. 
142
 Id. 
143
 Id.  
144
 Id. 
145
 Id. 
146
 Id. at 87. 
147
 Id. at 88. 
148
 Id. at 89 (analyzing the scope of the right). 
149
 Id. at 92. 
150
 Id.  
151
 Id. 
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restraint–censorship–analysis.152 Third, this case presented an apt 
analysis of the level of judicial scrutiny to be applied to Second 
Amendment challenges.  
Essentially, in Kachalsky, the court established that when a law 
imposes a substantial burden on core Second Amendment rights, 
“heightened scrutiny is triggered.”153 The court explained that 
heightened scrutiny may be akin to strict scrutiny when it is applied to 
laws that burden core rights,
154
 but that it is less than strict scrutiny, or 
intermediate scrutiny, when the regulation does not touch upon the 
core right.
 155
 After citing historical evidence to support this holding, 
the court found that carrying firearms outside of the home did not 
touch the core of the Second Amendment, and used intermediate 
scrutiny to uphold the New York regulation.
156
 
 Kachalsky misconstrues the Supreme Court’s holding in Heller. 
Kachalsky held that because New York’s licensing scheme regulates 
carrying weapons outside of the home, Heller is not completely 
relevant because it only applied to a ban inside of the home.
157
 While 
it is true that Heller held that the need for self-defense is most acute in 
the home,
158
 it is a stretch to presume that Heller means that the core 
right of self-defense is limited to the home. In Heller the Court 
referred to the Districts handgun ban and stated, “[t]his makes it 
impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of self-
defense and is hence unconstitutional.”159 And although Kachalsky is 
correct that the Court’s ultimate holding was limited to the challenged 
activity -- self-defense in the home -- the opinion is replete with 
language implicating a broader scope. In fact, the Court stated that the 
                                                 
152
 Id.  
153
 Id. at 93. 
154
 Id. at 93. 
155
 Id. at 93-96. 
156
 Id. 
157
 Id. at 94. 
158
 D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). 
159
 Id. at 630 (emphasis added). 
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meaning of the operative clause is to “guarantee the individual right to 
posses and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”160 
In Moore, Judge Posner distinguished Kachalsky and stated that: 
 
Our principal reservation about the Second Circuit’s analysis 
(apart from, disagreement, unnecessary to bore the reader 
with, some historical analysis in the opinion-we regard the 
historical issues as settled by Heller) is its suggestion that the 
Second Amendment should have much greater scope inside 
the home than outside simply because other provisions of the 
Constitution have been held to make that distinction. For 
example the opinion states that “in Lawrence v. Texas, the 
[Supreme] Court emphasized that the state’s efforts to 
regulate private sexual conduct between consenting adults is 
especially suspect when it intrudes into the home.” Well of 
course-the interest in having sex inside one’s home is much 
greater than the interest in having sex on the sidewalk in front 
of ones home. But the interest in self-protection is as great 
outside as inside the home.
161
 
 
Here, it is important to further distinguish Kachalsky and the 
regulation that the case addressed. New York’s law did not ban 
handgun registration, but rather placed the burden upon citizens to 
prove the need for carrying firearms. Even with the rigorous 
application process, that law was less restrictive than the Illinois 
law.
162
 Although the petitioners in that case were unable to obtain 
unrestricted permits, there was no evidence that all citizens had been 
denied such permits. While the opinion does not indicate so, there 
could be individuals who were able to show the appropriate level of 
proper cause. Perhaps—like Judge Posner’s Moore hypothetical163—
                                                 
160
 Id. at 592; see also id. at 584 (quoting Justice Ginsburg’s interpretation of 
the Second Amendments meaning of “bear”). 
161
 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (2012). 
162
 Id. 
163
 Id. at 937. 
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there is a female stalking victim that was able to obtain an unrestricted 
permit.
164
 As Judge Posner points out, although New York’s law is one 
of the most restrictive in the nation, it was still less restrictive than 
Illinois’s law.165 In New York, citizens retain the right to carry 
firearms, despite the difficulties that the registration process entails. In 
Illinois, no citizen was allowed to legally carry a firearm in public no 
matter how compelling their need. Arguably, the state has a 
compelling interest to protect to the public; however, the means used 
were not narrowly tailored to meet its ends. Illinois’s regulation placed 
a severe burden on the core right of self-defense by prohibiting the 
public from carrying firearms indiscriminately by all citizens. 
Although the state did have a compelling interest to protect, the law 
was not narrowly tailored to achieve that end because the restriction 
burdened all citizens, not just those who presented a specific risk. 
Therefore it would have failed heightened scrutiny had that analysis 
been applied. 
 
 E. The Supreme Court Cases Settled the Question of Historical 
Meaning 
 
Heller left much to be determined by lower courts. However, 
historical evidence was not one of those things. Although Heller has 
been criticized for an overreliance on historical interpretation, most 
notably by Judge Posner,
166
 the Court needed to determine the 
historical record in order to give lower courts discretion to create a 
judicial test, rather than constantly reevaluating the historical 
understanding of the Amendment. Although judges are not 
historians,
167
 in Heller it was necessary to interpret historical evidence 
in order to determine that the Second Amendment stands for an 
individual right to self-defense.  
                                                 
164
 Id. 
165
 Id. at 931. 
166
 Richard Posner, supra note 10.  
167
 Moore, 702 F. 3d at 943  (Judge Williams, dissenting). 
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In both Heller and McDonald the court conducted extensive 
historical analysis, and gave no indication that it wished for lower 
courts to replicate or interpret that analysis. In Moore, the parties and 
the amici presented the court with a wealth of historical evidence, 
which according to the court, sought to repudiate the historical record 
utilized in the two Supreme Court cases.
168
 In response to this 
evidence, the court states that “[s]imilar evidence…had of course been 
presented in [] Heller”169 and that “[t]he Supreme Court rejected 
[those arguments]. The appellees ask us to repudiate the Court’s 
historical analysis.  That we cannot do.”170  
Accordingly, by refusing to review the historical evidence anew, 
the Moore court gave appropriate judicial deference to the Supreme 
Courts opinion. Likewise, subsequent courts should only look to the 
historical evidence when absolutely necessary, and only when the 
Supreme Court has not previously defined the challenged legislation. 
While the dissent in Moore urged that courts must look at history for 
every new Second Amendment challenge: “Heller’s approach suggests 
that judges are to examine the historical evidence and then make a 
determination as to whether the asserted right…is within the scope of 
the Second Amendment.
171
 Although that statement may be true, 
Heller had already indicated that public carry is consistent with the 
right to self-defense. 
In Ezell v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit had already 
conducted an analysis as to when it is necessary for courts to review 
history in Second Amendment cases.
172
 In Ezell, a city ordinance 
disallowed private handgun ranges (even though the Chicago Police 
Department and federal agencies did have ranges within the borders of 
the city).
173
 The court urged that historical analysis hinges upon the 
scope of the regulated activity:  “McDonald confirms that if the claim 
                                                 
168
 Id. at 935. 
169
 Id.  
170
 Id. 
171
 Id. 
172
 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (2011). 
173
 Id. at 693-701. 
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concerns a state or local law, the “scope” question asks how the right 
was publically understood when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
proposed and ratified. Accordingly, if the government can establish 
that a challenged firearms law regulates activity falling outside the 
scope of the Second Amendment right as it was understood at the 
relevant historical moment…then the analysis stops there; the 
regulated activity is categorically unprotected.”174 The court also 
stated that when the historical evidence is inconclusive, then the courts 
must look to the strength of the government’s justification.175  As 
previously stated, Ezell misconstrued the relevant historical period; 
never the less, the inquiry is still pertinent. 
In Moore, the dissent admits that the historical record is 
inconclusive, while still claiming that history supports a ban on 
carrying firearms. In her dissent, Judge Williams urges that all courts 
should interpret the historical record when faced with new Second 
Amendment challenges.
176
 She urges the court to rehash the historical 
arguments made in Heller, while at the same time conceding that there 
was not a historical consensus on the issue of bearing arms in public.  
Judge Williams explains: “So while there are a variety of other sources 
and authorities, the ones I have discussed suggest that there was not a 
clear historical consensus that persons could carry guns in public for 
self-defense.”177  The dissent further concedes: “I do not mean to 
suggest that the historical evidence definitively demonstrates that there 
was not a right to carry arms for public self-defense at the time of the 
founding. The plaintiffs point to other authorities that they maintain 
reveal the opposite. At best, the history might be ambiguous as to 
whether there is a right to carry loaded firearms for potential self-
defense outside the home.”178   
                                                 
174
 Id. at 703 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3047 
(2010) and D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628-35 (2008)). 
175
 Id. 
176
 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F. 3d 933, 943 (2012) (Judge Williams, dissenting). 
177
 Id. at 946. 
178
 Id. at 947. 
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Without definitive historical evidence indicating that the right to 
self-defense ends in the home, the majority was bound to a reasonable 
inference based on the Supreme Court’s holding that there exists a 
constitutional right to self-defense.  The Supreme Court has settled the 
historical questions regarding the core right of self-defense, and by 
refusing to uphold Illinois’s blanket ban on carrying firearms based 
solely on conflicting historical interpretations, the majority correctly 
decided this case. 
 
F. Determining Future Second Amendment Cases 
 
The Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to self-
defense. This right extends to the states, and does not end when an 
individual steps out of her home. When deciding Second Amendment 
cases that call into question government regulations, courts should first 
determine whether the challenged activity falls within the scope of the 
Second Amendment and, if the activity does not fall within that scope,  
the court’s inquiry  ends, and  the legislation is valid. However, if the 
regulated activity does fall within the scope of the Second 
Amendment, courts must look to the restriction and determine the 
level of the burden placed upon the Second Amendment. The courts 
should apply heightened scrutiny; closer to strict scrutiny in cases 
where a severe burden is present and intermediate scrutiny when the 
burden is less severe. But this too will allow courts wide discretion to 
determine how severe the burden is. Although the Seventh Circuit did 
not adhere to this standard when deciding Moore v. Madigan, the court 
did arrive at the right result. Applying this standard to the facts of 
Moore, we see that Illinois’s ban was a severe burden on the right to 
self-defense. This regulation was not narrowly tailored nor the least 
restrictive means to reach the compelling governmental interest of 
preventing crime.
179
  
 Recently, a Tenth Circuit court decision held that the Second 
Amendment did not protect concealed carry. In Peterson v. Martinez, 
the court upheld a Colorado law forbidding non-residents from 
                                                 
179
 Id. at 941. 
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receiving concealed carry permits.
180
 However, non-residents could 
openly carry firearms.
181
 The court acknowledged that a two-step 
analysis is necessary, and found that the historical scope of the 
Amendment is to be determined first.
182
 The court then found support 
in Heller for it’s ruling that the Colorado regulation was 
constitutional.
183
 In Heller, the Court stated “the majority of the 19th-
century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on 
carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second 
Amendment or state analogues.”184 This holding does not conflict with 
Moore. In Colorado, non-residents could exercise their right to self-
defense by openly carrying firearms, and the right protected by the 
Second Amendment is a right to self-defense, not to a particular form 
of carry. Nothing prohibits states from placing reasonable limitations 
on where the right is exercised, but they may not completely outlaw 
the exercise of the right. When conducting this inquiry courts should 
avoid a reanalysis of historical evidence, as Heller has settled this 
issue.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The meaning of the Second Amendment has changed over time 
and for many it is still changing. Recently, the Supreme Court has 
found that the Second Amendment was drafted in order to protect an 
individual’s right to bear arms in self-defense. While acknowledging 
that this right has limits, the Court left it to lower courts to determine 
the boundaries of those limitations. The Seventh Circuit greatly 
expanded that Supreme Court holding by finding an Illinois law that 
banned all forms of concealed carry unconstitutional. However, the 
Seventh Circuit eschewed any in depth analysis of the constitutional 
implications, instead relying solely on the over-breadth of the 
                                                 
180
 Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197 (2013). 
181
 Id. at 1209. 
182
 Id. at 1211. 
183
 Id.  
184
 D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
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offending law. But, the decision finds support when a coherent 
analysis is derived from the emerging Second Amendment 
jurisprudence confirming the Seventh Circuit’s holding. 
Given the present national debate over gun regulation, it is certain 
that Second Amendment challenges will continue to be litigated. 
Perhaps soon, the Supreme Court will grant certiorari in a case to 
further define or place limits upon the scope of the Second 
Amendment. 
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